












Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Pemberton, A. (2012). Just-world victimology: Revisiting Lerner in the study of victims of crime. In H. Morosawa,
J. J. P. Dussich, & G. F. Kirchhoff (Eds.), Victimology and human security: New horizons (pp. 45-69). Wolf Legal
Publishers (WLP).
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.








































                                                 







Good things happen to good people, bad things to bad people. You get what you deserve. From 
fairytales to religion, from Robin Hood to James Bond, this message is repetitively conveyed. The 
right side wins, even against all odds, and the wrongdoers do not get to profit from their ill-gotten 
gains. Crime does not pay, while hard work and cooperation do.  
In a classic series of studies Melvin Lerner showed over three decades ago that this ‘justice 
motive’ is so engrained in people that they will adhere to it, even in the face of obviously conflicting 
evidence (e.g. Lerner and Simmons, 1966; Lerner and Miller, 1978; Lerner, 1980). In one of the most 
telling experiments, Lerner had two subjects work equally hard on a task, with their reward depending 
on a flip of the coin, one getting more, the other less. Observers who were aware of the manner of 
rewarding the workers, still overwhelmingly thought that the one who received the most, must have 
done the larger share. In Lerner’s words, the justice motive is a fundamental delusion (Lerner, 1980). 
This fundamental delusion is of particular relevance in clear instances of injustice. Here the justice 
motive is threatened and much of Lerner’s research and that of others concerning Just World theory 
has related to the strategies people employ to preserve their sense of a just world when faced with 
these situations.  
Lerner’s theory has played a role in the development of victimology (see Rock, 2007). It 
offered a particularly compelling theoretical explanation for the phenomenon of ‘victim blaming’. 
Here the notion of good things happening to good people and bad things to bad people is reversed. The 
fact that something bad has happened to someone, implies that he or she must be a bad (or at least 
irresponsible) person. The tendency to blame victims for their own misfortune has henceforth been 
documented in a wide range of situations; from crime (even homicide and genocide) to sickness.  
Lerner’s notion of the importance of the belief in a just world was also an integral part of 
Janoff-Bulman’s theory of ‘shattered assumptions’ (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Janoff-Bulman theorized 
that psychological complaints following victimization could be explained by the fact that experiencing 
crime severely jeopardizes victims’ previously held convictions about the world being a just place. 
This diminishes victims’ sense of control over and predictability of their environment. This shattering 
of assumptions  is associated with the onset of post-traumatic stress disorder. Although there has been 
some discussion of the ‘shattering’ mechanism Janoff-Bulman assumed (e.g. Winkel, 2007), a 
diminished sense of control and the cognition that the world is an unjust, evil place both still are 
central elements of current theories of post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g. Ehlers and Clark, 2000).  
It is important to note that the construct that Janoff-Bulman employed is slightly different from 
the justice motive that Lerner discerned (see Hafer and Begue, 2005). In the shattered assumptions 
theory, the belief in a just world is an individual difference measure which relates to the extent to 
 
 
which a subject actually believes the world is a just place (see Rubin and Peplau, 1975; for a review 
Furnham, 2003).  However as Hafer and Begue (2005) note ‘the essence of just-world theory is that 
most people have a “belief in a just world” in the sense that their underlying need to believe in a just 
world motivates them to behave as if they believed that the world is a just place and as if they wanted 




Except for reference to Lerner in studies into victim blaming or corollaries like rape myth 
acceptance and in studies into the mechanisms of the development of PTSD, the implications of just 
world theory and the ongoing research into this construct have been largely neglected in victimology.
3
 
This is unfortunate, because although Lerner (2003) himself provocatively concluded that although 
psychologists may have found the justice motive, they had also lost it and where perhaps not likely to 
find it again
4
, the body of research into just world theory is relevant in many ways to the development 
of victimological theory.  
This article is an attempt to make up some of the lost ground. First the current state of the just 
world theorizing will be discussed. In this overview particular attention will be paid to the various 
strategies that people employ in the face of injustice. This discussion will be followed by the 
application of just world theory to a number of issues that are relevant to the development of 
victimology. First Nils Christie (1986)’s description of the ideal victim and criminological notions 
surrounding it will be compared to just world theory. Is the ideal victim really ideal? Secondly the 
justice motive will be used to unravel a number of notions included in restorative justice theory. 
Thirdly I will discuss Van Dijk’s recent work on the notion of victim labelling (see Van Dijk 2006; 
2008), as this proffers a different explanation for many of the victimological findings relating to just 
world theory. Finally the somewhat pessimistic implications of the justice motive for advancing the 
position of victims will be noted.  
Throughout the article relevant victimological research will be used to demonstrate the use of 
just-world theory. In this process it will be shown that the research into the lived experience of victims 




Some fundamental notions 
Hafer and Begue (2005) provide a comprehensive overview of the research into just-world theory. I 
                                                 
2 This is also the reason why Lerner, Hafer & Begue and others prefer to speak of the justice motive (see also Ross and Miller, 
2002), rather than the need to believe in a just world. As Lerner pointed out the latter construct was a metaphor rather than 
an actual description of the justice motive (Lerner, 1997). In particular the term believe is problematic, as this refers to 
conscious thought, while the justice motive is often implicit in the behaviour of people. 
3 See f.e. the recent Handbook of Victims of Victimology, in which Lerner is referred to just once, see Walklate, 2007. 
4  The title of a 2003 article by Lerner in Personality and Social Psychology Review read “The Justice Motive. Where 
psychologists found it, how they lost it and why they might not find it again”.  
 
 
will restrict myself mainly to their discussion of the strategies people employ when faced with 
injustice, to which I will add the ongoing research into retributive justice, but three other features of 
their overview merit mentioning as well. 
In the first place Hafer and Begue (2005) remind us that the need to believe in a just world is 
often implicit (see also Lerner, 1980, 1998; Lerner and Goldberg, 1999).
5
 People are mostly unaware 
that the justice motive underlies their behaviour (see also Dalbert, 2001), and therefore will not report 
it as a conscious motive (Lerner, 2003). This is an additional reason to discern research into the justice 
motive from research concerning individual differences in the belief in a just world. The latter reflects 
people’s explicit or self-attributed motives and although these may be correlated with the justice 
motive, this is not necessarily the case. There may only be a loose correspondence between explicitly 
endorsing just world beliefs and the role the justice motive plays in people’s behaviour (Hafer and 
Begue, 2005). For example, experimental research into just-world theory has repeatedly shown the 
derogation of victims due to the justice motive. According to research by Callan et al (2007) this also 
involves negatively appraising a victims’ physical appearance. But how likely is it that someone will 
state that the victim was unattractive, because she was a victim? Even if one was aware of this, social 
desirability bias would surely prevent one from revealing the motive to third parties? (e.g. Correia et al, 
2001). 
Secondly there is the function of the justice motive. According to Hafer (2000; see also Hafer 
et al, 2005) the primary function is that it allows one to invest in long-term goals and to do so 
according to society’s rules for deservingness.  Moreover she argued that ‘given this function, people 
should have a greater need to believe in a just world if they have a strong focus on long-term 
investments and a strong desire to obtain goals through socially acceptable means that society dictates 
deserve certain positively valued outcomes: The more people need to believe in a just world, the more 
they should be motivated to preserve a sense of justice in the face of contradictory evidence.’ (Hafer 
and Begue, 2005:44). In addition Dalbert (1999, 2001) suggested that the justice motive helps foster a 
sense of well-being, overall and in particular in the face of negative life events.  
Finally the research into just-world theory shows that the necessity of employing the strategies 
for maintaining the justice motive increases with the threat an event poses to the belief in a just world 
(Lerner, 1980). In other words the higher the level of injustice, the more people need to take (cognitive, 
affective or behavioural) action to protect their just world beliefs. In particular both the innocence of a 
victim and the persistence of his or her suffering are threats to the belief in a just world (see Correia 
and Vala, 2003). As we will see these features can have perverse consequences. Where we may expect 
victims who are suffering indefinitely due to crime to be afforded the highest level of sympathy and 
support, just-world theory predicts negative responses to them to be more rather than less likely. As 
their suffering is difficult or hard to relieve, the social surroundings will employ strategies that involve 
                                                 
5 Which also calls into question whether it is in fact accurate to speak of the need to believe in a just world, as belief refers to a 
conscious deliberation (Hafer & Begue, 2005). 
 
 
a negative evaluation of or distancing from the victim to preserve the justice motive. These features 
may be further compounded by the so-called severity effect. This relates to the well-documented 
research finding that observers pay more attention to the victims’ irresponsibility when the negative 
effect of an action is large rather than when it is minor (e.g., Feigenson et al., 1997). The victim’s 
conduct therefore will be under closer scrutiny in the cases were his or her suffering is largest (see also 
Adams-Price et al, 2004).   
 
Victim-focused strategies for dealing with injustice 
Lerner’s original work mainly addressed the strategies people employ with respect to the victims of 
injustice (Lerner, 1980). He divided the strategies into rational strategies, irrational strategies and so-
called protective strategies.  
Rational strategies involve the acceptance of the presence of injustice. These involve either 
acting to prevent injustice before it occurs and restoring justice to unjust situations, or in other words 
prevention and compensation. In one of Lerner’s first experiments (Lerner and Simmons, 1966) 
observers watched a fellow student (actually a confederate) take part in a learning task and receive 
electric shocks for incorrect responses. In the first condition the observers were allowed to reassign the 
student involved in the task to a reward condition, in the second condition observers were not given 
this option. Most participants in the first condition decided to reassign the student, suggesting that if 
people are in the position to compensate victims they will do so. The crux of the experiment however, 
was that in both conditions the observers were asked to judge the student’s character. This was judged 
to be positive in the first condition, but far less favourably in the second. The student’s character was 
derogated due to his misfortune and the impossibility of undertaking compensatory activities (see also 
Haynes and Olson, 2006).  
Victim derogation is an example of an irrational strategy. In this subset of strategies people 
preserve the justice motive by refusing to accept the presence of injustice. Lerner described four 
irrational strategies. Three of them involve reinterpretation of the event. In the first the cause is 
reinterpreted. Here victims are perceived to be (at least in part) to blame for the incident. The distress 
caused by injustice is diminished or even resolved by maintaining that the victim was also at fault. 
Victims who are perceived to have a degree of responsibility for their victimization are particularly 
prone to be blamed (Haynes and Olson, 2006). Victim blaming has been documented in a wide array 
of situations, such as unemployment, sexual abuse of women and children, battered women, cancer, 
elderly people, and HIV positive people (see for an overview Haynes and Olson, 2006).  
In the second personal characteristics of the victim are reinterpreted. I have already noted the 
tendency for negative appraisals of the victim’s character (see Correia et al, 2001; 2003) and their 
attractiveness (Callan et al, 2007). Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) reveal a particular instance of 
victim derogation in the intergroup context. In their research they provided participants with evidence 
of mass-killing committed by their own ‘in-group’ (British and white Americans) against an ‘out-
 
 
group’ (Australian Aborigines and Native Americans). Providing in-group members with this evidence 
led them to infra-humanize the out-group to a greater degree. Infra-humanization refers to the denial to 
an individual or group of some of the characteristics that make us human, and in particular of the 
uniquely human secondary emotions like love, guilt or hope (Leyens et al, 2000). Knowledge of ‘our’ 
inhumanities against ‘them’ therefore leads us to see ‘them’ as less human. 
In the third the outcome of the event is revalued. The negative consequences of the event are 
downplayed and the possible positive consequences of undeserved suffering are stressed, for instance 
that the victimisation was a learning experience or that it builds character (Hafer and Begue, 2005). 
This is a topic that has not received much attention in the experiments into just world theory itself, but 
evidence of this is phenomenon is available from a variety of other sources. Bandura (1999) for 
instance notes the tendency to employ sanitizing euphemisms, like ‘alternative career enhancement’ 
for firing people or, in a far more extreme case, the ‘Final Solution’ for the Holocaust. The reactions of 
victims to their own suffering also show evidence of this strategy. Zoellner and Maercker’s (2006) 
review of the concept of posttraumatic growth, shows that some victims find that their victimisation 
has positive consequences in the longer term. It strengthened their bonds with their close ones, made 
them understand what is important in life. Nevertheless the same review shows post-traumatic growth 
to have an illusory aspect, in which the attempts of the victims to find something positive in their 
experience can be viewed as a cognitive effort to avoid the consequences of victimisation.  
Finally the observer may employ a strategy of denial/ withdrawal and the related construct of 
psychological distancing to the event. In denial/ withdrawal the observer attempts to avoid threats to 
the justice motive when they are encountered (Hafer and Begue, 2005). Psychological distancing 
involves creating a cognitive distance between oneself and the victim. The observer will attempt to 
discern cues that the victim is in some way different, so that the injustice that has befallen the victim 
will be unlikely to happen to the observer (Hafer, 2000). 
Psychological distancing is related to the first of Lerner’s so-called protective strategies, the 
‘two world theory’ (Lerner, 1980), which may be summarized in the idea that where our world is just, 
theirs is not (Lerner and Goldberg, 1999; Hafer and Begue, 2005). Research that varies the group-
status of victims shows that victims belonging to the same group as the observer pose a stronger threat 
to the justice motive than out-group members (see Correia et al, 2007; Aguiar et al, 2008). A more 
extreme form of this is moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990; Clayton and Opotow, 2003) in which the out-
group is deemed to be outside the scope of justice. A good example of the consequences of two-world 
theory and moral exclusion is provided by the research into genocide. Where moral exclusion plays a 
role in the commission of genocide (see generally Waller, 2006), two-world theory is an explanation 
for the Western world’s apparent indifference to intervene in genocide (see generally Power, 2003).   
An additional protective strategy is what Lerner called ‘ultimate justice’ (Lerner, 1980). Here 
the justice motive is protected by the notion that although justice might not seem to be done in every 
instance, it will definitely be done in the long run (e.g. Maes, 1998). Lerner (1997) has connected this 
 
 
belief in ultimate justice with religion. As Hafer and Begue (2005) note the belief ultimate justice 
reduces the threat posed by instances of injustice (what Maes calls ‘immanent justice’). Consistent 
with this Lerner (1997) found religious people to show less evidence of victim blaming than non-
religious people. 
Finally Lerner (1980) proposed a penultimate defence in which people pretend with both 
themselves and with others that they do not believe in a just world (and probably also that they have 
no need to hold such a belief).  
 
Perpetrator-focused strategies for dealing with injustice  
It is interesting to note that although Lerner was most interested in people’s reactions to the victims of 
injustice, the threat to the justice motive also relates to people’s reactions to perpetrators of injustice. 
There is a relative absence of studies that explicitly relate the justice motive to people’s reactions to 
perpetrators of injustice (Hafer and Begue, 2005), but in the collection of essays in honour of Lerner 
‘The Justice motive in everyday life’ (Ross and Miller, 2002), both Vidmar and Darley connect their 
research into punishment and retributive justice to the need to believe in a just world (Vidmar, 2002; 
Darley, 2002). In the same volume Ellard and colleagues discuss the concept of demonizing of 
offenders within the framework of the justice motive (Ellard et al, 2002). In addition recent research 
by Wenzel and colleagues concerning retributive justice and other strategies for dealing with 
perpetrators of injustice shows a strong consistence with the victim-focused strategies discussed by 
Lerner (e.g. Wenzel et al, 2008, Okimoto et al 2009, Wenzel and Thielmann, 2006).  
A central question in the research Darley and his colleagues undertook is why we punish 
offenders (e.g. Darley et al, 2000; Darley, 2002, Carlsmith et al 2002). And the answer is as Darley 
himself says ‘we punish others who have committed prototypic “crimes” –intentional infliction of 
wrongful, immoral harms on others- because we wish to give the actor his justly deserved punishment 
for the wrongful action he took’ (Darley, 2002:331). Although this punishment may deter the offender 
or others from committing acts in the future, neither is the central purpose of punishment. Darley 
shows the punishment to be proportionate to the magnitude of the wrong committed, rather than its 
(perceived) effectiveness in the prevention of future offences. This notion of just deserts (e.g. Von 
Hirsch, 1993) or retribution is consistent with Lerner’s theory. We punish in proportion to the threat 
posed by the offender’s action to our need to believe in a just world.    
The threat posed by the offender’s action is more proportionate to the wrong committed rather 
than the harm caused. Alter, Kernochian and Darley (2007) showed transgression wrongfulness to 
outweigh harmfulness in determining sentence severity. Similarly the results of Gromet and Darley 
(2006; 2009a)’s research reveal the severity of crime to be related to the desire to meet out retributive 
punishment.  
Research by Wenzel and colleagues outlines that an alternative reaction to the perpetrator’s 
actions is what they call value restoration (see for an overview Wenzel et al, 2008). Here the injustice 
 
 
is undone through actions on the part of the offender to repair the harm caused and simultaneously 
reaffirm his or her commitment to the values breached by the transgression (or in other words through 
a restorative justice procedure, e.g. Braithwaite, 2002). In cases of lower severity Wenzel et al (2008; 
see also Gromet and Darley, 2006, 2009a, 2009b) show value restoration alone to be deemed a 
sufficient reaction by observers, while in high severity cases the value restoration may also be 
included in the reaction to crime, but only alongside a retributive response.  
The importance of value restoration also depends on the question whether or not offender and 
victim are regarded as sharing membership in a relevant community or inclusive group (Wenzel et al, 
2008). The strategy of value restoration applies to in-group perpetrators who are therefore expected to 
uphold community values, but not to out-group members. Support for value restoration is correlated 
with group cohesiveness, as this increases people’s concern about group values (Wenzel et al., 2009). 
The ingroup-outgroup divide in reactions to perpetrators maps on to Lerner’s protective strategy of the 
two-world theory. Our world is just, but theirs is not necessarily so.  
The severity of the crime and the extent of shared identity interact (Gromet and Darley, 2009a). 
Severe crimes will lead to an attempt to distance oneself from the offenders and to exclude them from 
the in-group (see also Eidelman, Silvia, & Biernat, 2006). As Pemberton (2010) notes, crimes of a 
sufficient severity automatically convey a sense of ‘otherness’ to the perpetrator. This sense of 
otherness relates to an earlier notion of Darley that demonizing the offender serves to protect the 
justice motive (Darley, 1992).  
As Ellard et al (2002) note, this may, at first glance, seem somewhat paradoxical. ‘After all if 
evil behaviour is threatening, isn’t demonizing just the opposite of what people should do to protect 
their belief in a just world. Why would people want to populate their just world with evil people? 
(Ellard et al, 2002: 352). As Ellard et al (2002) point out, however, the alternative, the unfortunately 
empirically well supported fact that ordinary people commit extremely evil acts,
6
 is more disturbing. If 
anyone can be the author of evilness, it is much harder to maintain a belief in a just world, while 
believing that evil acts are undertaken by equally evil people makes it more recognizable and 
controllable. The threat that evil poses to the justice motive is located in individuals, who can be 
contained or even eradicated. The evildoers become the rare exceptions to the rule that the world is 
basically a just place. Moreover their humanness is called into question. Perpetrators of evil are 
dehumanized (Haslam, 2006), by using categories of subhuman creatures (for example, the word 
predator, relating to animals) or by using categories of negatively evaluated unhuman creatures (as is 
implied by demonizing) and are thereby morally excluded from the scope of justice (Opotow, 1990).   
The research into (the motives behind the) punishment of perpetrators of crime reveals the 
existence of –Lerner’s terms - both rational strategies (retribution, value restoration) and protective 
strategies (two-world theory, demonizing). Non-rational victim-related strategies, in addition, may 
                                                 




implicate offenders as well as victims. The reinterpretation of the cause of the event may reapportion 
blame between the victim and the offender, although victim blaming may coincide with a severe 
retributive response toward the offender (see below). Reinterpretation of the outcome, in more positive 
terms, can also reduce the perception of wrongdoing by the offender. 
 
The relative importance of strategies 
Hafer and Begue (2005) note that different just-world strategies may co-occur. People may at once 
attempt to compensate victims, while they psychologically distance themselves from them. Similarly 
the urge for retribution may coincide with either the protective strategy of demonizing or attempts to 
achieve value restoration. In the latter the compensatory strategy focused on the victim is an integral 
part of the strategy focused on the offender.  
As noted throughout this article a variety of factors play a role in the choice of strategy. In the 
case of the offender the severity of the crime stresses the need for retribution, while shared identity 
with the offender makes a value restoration strategy more likely. In the case of the victim the 
possibility of offering compensation is important, with victim derogation and even blaming being 
more likely in the absence of such possibilities. Similarly failed attempts at compensation or enduring 
suffering of the victim heighten the need for non-rational strategies in coping with the injustice the 
victim suffered. 
A particularly important issue for victimology is the relative importance of the rational 
strategies people may employ in the face of injustice. Do they prioritize punishment of offenders over 
compensation to victims or the other way around? The former rather than the latter appears to be true. 
The aversion at injustice, the anger or ‘moral outrage’ this causes (e.g. Miller, 2001; Darley & Pittman, 
2003) are easily aligned with a punitive response towards the offender. In dealing with the victim 
however an observer is faced with two conflicting emotions, with the aversion at the situation sitting 
uneasily with the sympathy and empathy needed to address the plight of the victim (e.g. Folger & 
Pugh, 2002). Similarly where increasing severity of crime simply leads to a stronger desire to punish 
the offender, a similar increase heightens the tension of dealing with victims. As noted earlier, the 
more a victim suffers, the more likely it is that a non-rational strategy, like victim blaming, derogation 
or distancing, will be employed. Finally employing the strategy of psychological distancing to victims, 
will lead people to be relatively indifferent to the victims’ needs (Loewenstein and Small, 2007), while 
people are rarely indifferent about offenders (e.g. Miller, 2001; Hogan and Embler, 1981; Van Prooijen, 
2009).   
The predominance of punishment over compensation is borne out by recent research by Van 
Prooijen, 2009 and Gromet and Darley, 2009. Van Prooijen (2009) showed the impulse to punish the 
offender to outweigh compensation of the victim in crimes ranging from relatively mild (pick-
pocketing) to severe (kidnapping or rape). Gromet and Darley (2009) revealed punishing the offender 
to be the default reaction to crime, although instructing participants to think about the victims’ fate did 
 
 
increase the importance of ‘restorative’ options.   
 
 
Victimological concepts and just-world theory 
 
The ideal victim? 
In a seminal and much-quoted publication Nils Christie (1986) coined the term ‘ideal victim’. Briefly, 
he described the ideal victim along the following lines (see also Dignan, 2005): 
- The victim is weak in relation to the offender – the ‘ideal victim’ is likely to be either female, 
sick, very old or very young (or a combination of these). 
- The victim is, if not acting virtuously, then at least going about their legitimate, ordinary 
everyday business. 
- The victim is blameless for what happened. 
- The victim is unrelated to and does not know the ‘stranger’ who has committed the offence. 
- The offender is unambiguously big and bad. 
According to Christie these ‘ideal victims’ are those who -when hit by crime – are most readily given 
the complete and legitimate status of being a victim, with the little old lady being his favourite 
example (Christie, 1986). They are the deserving victims, the ones that are most likely to receive our 
sympathy and in whose names victim services are justified (Spalek, 2006). Christie criticised the ideal 
victim for not adequately reflecting the reality of many instances of crime, as many victims of crime 
do not share the characteristics of the ‘ideal victim’.  
Except for its lack of a factual base, the notion of the ideal victim is also supposed to have 
subsequent negative consequences for the way offenders are viewed and treated. Many authors have 
noted that the ideal victim figures heavily in the media (e.g. Reiner, 2002) and in populist campaigns 
for more severe sentences (e.g. Scheingold et al, 1994; Miers, 2007). The concern is that offenders are 
increasingly seen as ‘unambiguously big and bad’ - although most of them are not (see also Green, 
2007) – because of the emphasis on ideal victims. The subsequent punitive turn in punishment and 
pressure on suspects’ and offenders’ rights is, at least in part, caused by this stereotype (see also 
Christie, 2010). 
However the research into the justice motive suggests two problematic features of this line of 
reasoning. First and foremost, viewed through the lens of the justice motive, ideal victims are in fact 
anything but ideal. They represent a clear challenge to the notion that bad things do not happen to 
good people. The research into the justice motive suggests that when faced with the injustice suffered 
by victims, the first inclination of observers is often to review their conduct and character to see 
whether they are to blame for their misfortune. Moreover, the victim’s enduring suffering, will not lead 
to an ongoing outpouring of support. This is instead likely to run out long before victims have had 
time to adequately cope with their ordeal. 
 
 
Evidence is abundant of these phenomena. Miers (2007) for instance notes the importance of 
blamelessness in the compensation of victims. Where the victim’s behaviour contributes to his or her 
victimization, compensation may be reduced or victims may be ineligible for criminal injuries 
compensation. Moreover, in the United Kingdom, victims with a history of criminal behaviour of their 
own are also excluded, with the mere fact that they are  ‘criminals’ themselves conveying a permanent 
sense of blameworthiness on them.  
The phenomenon of secondary victimisation of victims and victim blaming by justice 
authorities is another case in point. Contrary to what one would expect when viewing the notion of the 
ideal victim, these phenomena are also well-documented in the case of ‘ideal victims’. The experience 
of co-victims of homicide, even when they are clearly ‘ideal victims’, is often marred by instances of 
secondary victimisation (e.g. Spungen, 1998; Armour, 2007). In addition, as predicted by the research 
into the justice motive, the reaction of their social surroundings is often not one of enduring sympathy 
and empathy. Instead victms continuing suffering, will lead to strategies of avoidance and distancing 
(e.g. Doka, 1988).  
The mere existence of Victim Support can serve as a final illustration. A large part of Victim 
Support’s work involves measures to reduce secondary victimization and deliver emotional support to 
victims (see Pemberton, 2009), efforts to fill in the void in the societal reaction to victimization. The 
necessity of these types of services stems from the fact that people’s default reaction to victimization 
includes blaming victims, and that the victim’s suffering often does not elicit (sufficient) sympathy and 
support from their immediate environment. That we needed an organization to provide ‘tea and 
sympathy’ to victims should serve as a lasting reminder of this fact. 
A second problematic feature of the ideal victim is its proposed effect on the way the offender 
is viewed. In Christie’s reasoning the deservingness of the ideal victim and the sympathy he or she 
elicits negatively affects people’s perception of the offender. This however sits uneasily with the 
evidence that the reaction to the offender is predominant in dealing with threats to the justice motive 
and that in cases of ideal victims, a severe retributive response co-occurs with victim-blaming and 
derogation.  
This point is maybe best illustrated by the description of a different stereotype. In an equally 
seminal publication as Christie’s, which is nevertheless largely ignored in victimological circles, 
social-psychologist Roy Baumeister described the so-called ‘Myth of Pure Evil’: 
- The offender intentionally inflicted severe harm on the victim. 
- This harm was primarily motivated by the wish to harm the victim, merely for the pleasure of 
doing so. The harm was not inflicted for instrumental reasons, nor was it used reluctantly. 
- Evil and evil offenders are so by nature and this nature has a permanent quality.  
- The harm is committed by the other, the stranger or even the enemy.  
- The victim is innocent and good. 
Although Christie’s stereotype is obviously similar to Baumeister’s,  the latter situates the portrayal of 
 
 
ideal victims squarely as an element of a protective, offender-focused strategy to deal with threats to 
the justice motive, namely demonizing the offender. The populist campaigns that invoke the ideal 
victim, therefore are not so much focused on delivering higher levels of support and compensation to 
the victim, which should be expected if sympathy for the victim was the main driver for action, but 
instead on more severe sentences to the author of evil, the offender. The ‘idealization’  of the victim is 
then a consequence rather than a cause of the way the offender is viewed and the cases where the 




    
The justice motive in restorative justice theory 
Christie contrasted the stereotype of the ideal victim with what he saw as the reality of victims’ 
experience, but his own perception of reality proved to be a social construction in itself. Van Dijk 
(2006) described this ‘ideal victim of restorative justice’ as being ‘free of vengefulness and mentally 
ready to accept apologies from the offender and to offer forgiveness.’ Pemberton, Winkel and 
Groenhuijsen (2007:11) similarly consider this ideal victim to be ‘forgiving, not punitive, more 
interested in compensation than punishment, and symbolic compensation at that, part of the same 
community as the offender, not afraid of the offender, wanting and capable of full participation in the 
case.’  
The point that I would like to make here is not that this stereotype does not adequately capture 
the experience of many victims of crime, in particular those suffering the most severe forms of 
victimization (see already Pemberton et al 2007; Pemberton 2009, 2010). Instead it is relevant to 
emphasize that the ‘ideal victim of restorative justice’ concurs with the justice motive, in the sense that 
observers would much prefer victims to act in accordance with Christie’s stereotype. The ideal victim 
of restorative justice does not suffer indefinitely, is capable in a large extent of dealing with the 
consequences of their victimization him or herself and his or her needs may be met by the offering of  
(often symbolic) compensation. These features all reduce the threat posed by injustice. Instead victims 
suffering indeterminately, for whom the damage has permanent qualities and who are vindictive and 
vengeful pose an enduring threat to the justice motive. Van Dijk (2006) provides an extensive 
discussion of the evidence of the negative societal reaction to angry, vengeful victims. Viewed through 
the lens of the justice motive, the unease caused by these victims is due to the fact that they serve as 
enduring reminders of injustice and our inability to resolve it. In sum: the justice motive predicts an 
observer bias for the ‘ideal victim of restorative justice’ and against the retributive, vengeful victim. 
Similar evidence of the justice motive’s role in restorative justice theory is provided by 
another seminal Christie publication. His 1977 article ‘Conflicts as property’ is one of the most widely 
cited in criminology. Central in this paper is the notion that crime can be redefined as conflict and that 
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conflict represents the represents ‘the most interesting property taken away, not the goods originally 
taken away from the victim, or given back to him.’ (Christie 1977; 7). Again this can be viewed in 
conjuncture with the justice motive. Both notions may be seen as non-rational strategies for dealing 
with injustice. The event is reinterpreted, from being an unjust crime to a valuable conflict.
8
 The 
positive aspects of the outcome of the event are stressed, in the sense that the conflict has provided 
possibilities for ‘norm-clarification’. The point here is not so much that I find the first notion to be 
erroneous (Pemberton 2010; see also Duff, 2003), and that the second only applies under certain 
circumstances (Pemberton 2010; see Wenzel et al, 2008) but that both the re-evaluation of the cause of 
suffering and the emphasis of positive outcomes can serve to reduce justice-related threat experienced 
by observers. The unease caused by the fact that bad things happen to good people is decreased by 
calling into question whether they are in fact bad things. 
Taken together: the charge that just world theory offers against Christie’s point of view, which 
resounds in the work of all too many other authors in the field of restorative justice, is that it attempts 
to resolve the problems in the reaction to crime by (grammatically) reducing or even outright denying 
the injustice that is inherent to it (see also Pemberton, 2010).  This may contribute to easing justice-
related threat, but  these non-rational strategies are not very conducive to developing a coherent theory 
of justice.  
 
Victim labelling 
Recently Jan van Dijk discussed similar problematic features to the reaction to victimization (see Van 
Dijk, 2006, 2008) and I have referred to and agreed with a number of his findings throughout this 
article. His general notion of victims being disempowered, blamed and derogated in the societal 
reaction to them and the bias against their expression of anger concur with the gist of this article. I 
may not fully agree with his description of ‘treatment-oriented victimology’, but I can quite follow the 
possibility that the ubiquitous overuse of the word trauma in the description of victims may not be in 
their interest (see also Pemberton, 2008).
9
 
In fact Van Dijk’s analysis reveals a rather intriguing phenomenon, that a desire for retribution 
and punishment of crime in the public (see also Carlsmith et al, 2002) may coexist with denunciation 
of retributive feelings on the part of the victim. In the light of the justice motive this may be explained 
through the fact that retributive justice may be a strategy for reducing the threat to justice, while the 
victims desire for retribution or even revenge may serve as a reminder of the enduring nature of this 
threat. An interesting avenue for experimental research into the justice motive would therefore be to 
explore whether victims displaying anger leads to similar results as their enduring suffering. 
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Ehlers and Clark, 2000). 
 
 
However as to the cause of the phenomena Van Dijk describes and subsequently his solution I 
find myself at odds with his analysis. According to Van Dijk the core of the problem lies in the word 
victim itself. Van Dijk’s version of victim labelling theory (see also Miers, 1989; Rock, 2004) traces 
the origin of the word victim to its religious roots (Van Dijk, 2006: 2008). Van Dijk (2006:4) shows 
that ‘the word victim in European and Arab languages originates from an ubiquitous religious ritual, 
the offering of a sacrifice as part of the worship of a god.‘ And in the Christian tradition this refers to 
the figure of Jesus Christ. According to Van Dijk (2008;20) Jesus Christ does not just stand for 
innocent suffering. His image also stands for meekness and mandatory forgiveness. And subsequently 
(Van Dijk, 2008:21) ‘ In the context of Christian culture, victims are challenged to follow in the steps 
of Christ at the Cross. They are expected to play a healing role in the aftermath of the crime. The label 
of victim invites them to render a service to the community by relinquishing their natural right to seek 
vengeance. By labelling them as victims, those affected by crime are forced into a passive role.’ He 
therefore concludes that relinquishing the term victim and/ or uncovering its hidden connotations will 
serve as a part of the solution to the problems faced by crime victims.  
I however am not so optimistic, as the research into the justice motive also predicts the type of 
reaction to victims that Van Dijk observes. The question then becomes whether, the reactions to 
victimisation are due to Christian connotations with the term victim or that the latter is better 
understood as a religious enshrinement of the justice motive.  
My reading of the literature leads me to believe that the latter is the case. Just-world effects 
have also been documented in cases where the word victim is absent (see generally Hafer and Begue, 
2005) or even where no words at all are used to describe the victims suffering (Pancer, 1988). 
Providing a description of the suffering of a person or the event that caused their suffering is sufficient. 
Similar effects are found in instances of non-criminal injustice (Hafer & Begue, 2005). Blaming or 
derogating people for their misfortune and attempting to psychologically distance oneself from them is 
not restricted to those situations for which the victim label is normally used. Similar findings are also 
observed in job lay-offs or sickness (see e.g. Haynes and Olson, 2006).   
There is cross-cultural evidence for the need to believe in a just world (e.g. Furnham, 1993, 
Pepitone and L’Armand, 1996; see also Lee et al, 1997). Negative reactions to victims are also found 
in research with non-Western, non-Christian subjects, and there is also evidence that these effects are 
stronger rather than weaker (f.e. Mori et al, 1995, Yamawaki & Tschanz, 2005). Religious subjects are 
more inclined to employ the ultimate justice strategy - i.e. that justice will be served in the end - and 
there is evidence that they therefore are less rather than more likely to display many of the negative 
reactions to victims that Van Dijk perceives (see Spilka, Hood, Honsburger and Gorusch, 2003 and 
Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren and Dernelle, 2005; for the role of the justice motive in this 
phenomenon, see Pichon and Saroglou, 2009). Both the cross-cultural evidence and the research 




This is also true for the evidence of differences within the Christian population. Closed-
minded religious subjects, i.e. those adhering to fundamentalism or orthodoxy, are less likely to 
display helping behaviour (see Jackson and Esses, 1997, 2000), in particular if the suffering person 
can be considered to belong to a different group (Batson, Anderson and Collins, 2005). While it is hard 
to see how victim labelling theory would explain these findings, Saroglou (2003) shows both they can 
be helpfully understood through just-world theory, with fundamentalist religious subjects displaying 
higher levels of immanent justice, while more open-minded subjects display higher levels of ultimate 
justice (see also Pichon and Saroglou, 2009).  
These research findings form a stark contrast to the importance Van Dijk places on the word 
used to describe victims and their ordeal. This leads me to suspect that replacing the term ‘victim’ will 
not be effective in reducing the negative societal reactions to victims of crime. Using ‘survivor’ or 
‘aggrieved party’ to describe a person who has suffered injustice will not obscure the threat to the need 
to believe in a just world that that person poses to observers.  
 
 
The justice motive and improving the plight of victims of crime 
 
Throughout the article we have seen evidence of victim-blaming being caused by the need to believe 
in a just world. Lerner’s contention that the justice motive is a fundamental human characteristic 
implies that reducing the extent of victim-blaming in society will be a never-ending uphill battle. 
Moreover the revelation that victims who are in greatest need of sympathy and support due to their 
enduring suffering may be withheld it for that same reason is quite unsettling. Those most deserving of 
our support are only ‘ideal’  victims if their victimization is invoked in strategies of demonizing the 
offender.  
The justice motive provides equally pessimistic predictions of increasing the relative priority of victim 
compensation. In dealing with injustice observers first and foremost include strategies in reaction to 
the perpetrator’s behaviour and punishing the offender is people’s default reaction to crime and 
outweighs compensating the victim. However, although retributive responses may be preferred, the 
victim’s own vengefulness will be met with negative reactions, as this serves as a reminder to the 
injustice the victim suffered. Instead the ‘ideal victim of restorative justice’ may in fact be the most 
preferred victim-stereotype. 
Replacing the word ‘victim’ will not be effective in reducing these negative societal reactions to 
victims. The Mark of Abel is conveyed by the mere fact that the victims suffered injustice, and that 
this injustice subsequently threatens the need to believe in a just world.  The latter delusion is 
apparently fundamental to the human condition and in my opinion fundamental to the development of 
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